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STEPHEN E. WOODBURY*
Aesthetic Nuisance: The Time Has
Come To Recognize It
INTRODUCTION
Nuisance law protects one landowner from the activity of another
landowner when that activity substantially' and unreasonably interferes
with the use and enjoyment of his or her land.2 The overwhelming bulk
of actionable nuisances involve four types of harm: noise,3 like that
generated from a factory;4 odor,' like that produced from a piggery;6 dust,
like that coming from coal trucks;' and, a safety hazard, like that present
from an explosives factory.8 An interference with the plaintiffs' use and
enjoyment of land is unreasonable when the harm to the plaintiff exceeds
the value to the defendant and the community of the offensive activity."
*B.A., University of Chicago; J.D., University of Michigan; Member, State Bar of New Hamp-
shire. This article stems in part from a nuisance suit in Placitas, New Mexico involving a noisy and
unattractive oil pipeline pump station located in a scenic residential area, which suit the author
worked on when a member of the State Bar of New Mexico.
1. See Robie v. Lillis, 112 N.H. 492. 299 A.2d 155, 158 (1972). "Substantial harm is that in
excess of the customary interferences a land user suffers in an organized society. It denotes an
appreciable and tangible interference with a property interest." A-6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY,
§28.25, at 73 (A. J. Casner ed. 1954).
2. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 821D-F 822 (1979).
The use of nuisance law is broad. "There is simply no common law doctrine that approaches
nuisance in comprehensiveness or detail as a regulator of land use and of technological abuse.
Nuisance actions have involved pollution of all physical media-air, water, land-by a wide variety
of means. . . . Nuisance actions have challenged virtually every major industrial and municipal
activity which is today the subject of comprehensive environmental regulation--the operation of
land fills, incinerators, sewage treatment facilities, activities at chemical plants, aluminum, lead and
copper smelters, oil refineries, pulp mills, rendering plants, quarries and mines, textile mills and a
host of other manufacturing activities .... Nuisance theory and case law is (sic] the common law
backbone of modern environmental and energy law." W. Rodgers, Jr., Handbook on Environmental
Law §2.1, at 100 (1977).
3. See, e.g., Hooks v. International Speedways, Inc., 263 N.C. 686, 140 S.E.2d 387 (1965)
(church enjoined construction of an automobile race track due to noise interfering with church
services).
4. See Powell v. Bentley & Gerwig Furniture Co., 34 W.Va. 804, 12 S.E. 1085 (1891).
5. See, e.g., Gerrish v. Wishbone Farm of N.H., Inc., 108 N.H. 237, 231 A.2d 622 (1967)
(chicken farmer enjoined from disposing of chicken manure on property due to odor).
6. See Jewett v. Deerhorn Enter. Inc., 281 Or. 469, 575 P.2d 164 (1978). Although noise and
flies were also part of the plaintiff's complaint in this case, these problems were incidental to the
odor problem.
7. See West v. National Mines Corp., 168 W. Va. 578, 285 S.E.2d 670 (1981).
8. See Wilson v. Phoenix Powder Mfg. Co., 40 W. Va. 413, 21 S.E. 1035 (1895).
9. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 826 (1979).
An interesting recent case of balancing of interests involved a soup kitchen. In Amory Park
Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Community Servs., 148 Ariz. I, 712 P.2d 914 (1985) (en banc),
the court held: "The evidence of the multiple trespasses upon and defacement of the residents'
property supports the trial court's conclusion that the interference caused by the defendant's operation
was unreasonable despite its charitable cause." Id., 712 P.2d at 921.
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When a nuisance exists, a court may either enjoin the activity,' ° or award
damages for the harm caused by the activity."
Traditionally, courts have refused to hold the unsightly or visually
aesthetically displeasing aspects of a neighbor's property as an actionable
nuisance. 2 For example, in Mathewson v. Primeau, 3 the accumulation
of old automobiles, crates, boxes, lumber, and discarded household ap-
pliances on a neighbor's land, although deemed unsightly by the Wash-
ington Supreme Court, was not actionable. The court reasoned that injunctive
actions based purely on aesthetic considerations are "a great enlargement
of the powers of the courts over the properties and customs of the peo-
ple. "'4 In other words, courts traditionally have held that a landowner
has the right to do what he will with his property, and a judge should
not use his subjective notions of ugliness to interfere with that property
right.
Recently, however, there has been evidence of a judicial rebellion
against allowing aesthetically displeasing activities to go unchecked on
a neighbor's land. One significant case is the decision of the Colorado
Court of Appeals in Allison v. Smith.' 5 In that case, the plaintiffs owned
a small recreational cabin in the mountains which they visited on week-
ends and vacations. Directly across from the plaintiffs' front porch, de-
fendant landowner began to stockpile old cars, scrap metal, petrochemical
drums, litter and other "obnoxious debris."' 6 The plaintiffs consequently
ceased using their property because the psychic benefit they got from
going to the cabin had been destroyed. They filed suit for injunctive relief
and damages. The court found the "unsightly eyesore"' 7 actionable, and
ordered that the property be returned to its prior vacant state. The court
stated: "legitimate but unsightly activity such as the accumulation of
debris on land or the operation of a junkyard... may become a private
nuisance if it is unreasonably operated so as to be unduly offensive to its
neighbors."' 8
This article evaluates the merit of allowing a landowner to enjoin a
10. See, e.g., Gerrish v. Wishbone Farms of N.H., Inc., 108 N.H. 237, 231 A.2d 622 (1967)
(enjoining chicken farmer from disposing of chicken manure on property due to odor).
11. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970) (awarding
permanent damages for pollution caused by cement plant); Pate v. City of Martin, 614 S.W.2d
(Tenn. 1981) (awarding damages for reduced rental value due to nuisance).
12. See generally 58 AM. JUR. 2d Nuisances §44 (1971). ("it is not in itself sufficient to create
a nuisance that a thing is unsightly or that it offends the aesthetic sense.")
13. 64 Wash. 2d 929, 395 P.2d 183 (1964).
14. Id., 395 P.2d 189 (quoting Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W.Va. 608,
192 S.E. 291 (1937) (concurring opinion)).
15. 695 P.2d 791 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
16. Id. at 793.
17. Id. at 794.
18. Id.
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neighbor's activity which is aesthetically displeasing. The first section
examines the growing influence of aesthetic considerations in nuisance
cases. The second section explains why courts should consider aesthetic
concerns in nuisance actions. The final section discusses desirable limi-
tations on employing aesthetics concerns in nuisance suits.
THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF AESTHETIC CONCERNS IN JUDICIAL
DECISIONMAKING
The first judicial opinion which expressly recognized that aesthetic
qualities should be routinely taken into account as a factor in nuisance
cases was the New Hampshire Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Robie
v. Lillis. 9 At issue was whether to enjoin the maintenance of a boat
storage shed located in a residential area adjacent to a lake. The defendants
would move boats in and out of the shed along a narrow access road
during three months of the year. The court found insufficient evidence of
any safety hazard to children using the access road, of the shed being a
fire hazard, or of an unreasonable amount of dust or noise being produced
by the activity of the defendants. More importantly, the court did not
accept the plaintiffs' "strongest contention" ' that the shed was unsightly
as located in this particular residential area. The court reached this result
only because the shed was not sufficiently ugly. The court forewarned
that "the unaesthetic quality of an activity is . . . an important
consideration" 2' in nuisance cases.
A few years later the New Hampshire Supreme Court was presented
with a factual situation which the court found warranted relief under a
nuisance theory largely due to aesthetic concerns. In Heston v. Ousler,22
the defendant constructed a dock on a lake which bordered plaintiffs'
shorefront property. The dock "totally obscure[d]" the plaintiffs' view of
the lake from their home.'3 The court also found that the use of the dock
would create a safety hazard for the plaintiffs when swimming in their
own waterspace. Emphasizing aesthetic considerations, the court ordered
that the dock be moved. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has since
used aesthetic concerns as a factor in deciding other nuisance cases.24
19. 112 N.H. 492, 299 A.2d 155 (1972).
20. Id., 299 A.2d, at 160.
21. Id.
22. 119 N.H. 58, 398 A.2d 536 (1979).
23. Id., 398 A.2d, at 538. ("The configuration of the shoreline is such that when the plaintiffs
look out to the open lake from their home, the defendants' dock is directly in front of them and it
totally obscures their view.")
24. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 444 A.2d 519, 521 (1982) (kennel constructed
near cottage and business enjoined in part because "the kennel detracts from the appearance of the
premises").
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Prior to Robie and Heston, one court, the West Virginia Supreme Court,
cited aesthetic qualities of an activity in its nuisance decisions. That court,
however, did not give aesthetic considerations the emphasis the New
Hampshire high court would. In Martin v. Williams,' for example, the
West Virginia court enjoined the operation of a used car lot in a residential
area primarily because it was noisy, cast light, and lowered property
values. The court also noted, however, that the lot would cause a "de-
struction of the aesthetic nature of the neighborhood."'26 The West Virginia
Supreme Court has mentioned aesthetic concerns in a modest way in other
decisions.27
The first court to state that aesthetic considerations alone may warrant
injunctive relief in a nuisance suit was the Oregon Supreme Court in its
1975 decision of Hay v. Stevens."s In that case, the plaintiff owned a
summer home and motel near a beach. The defendant owned unimproved
land between the plaintiff's land and the beach, and constructed a "hog-
wire" fence on his land. The plaintiff sued in nuisance solely on aesthetic
grounds. The court stated that "in the appropriate case recovery will be
permitted under the law of nuisance for an interference with visual aes-
thetic sensibilities." '29 Nevertheless, the court declined to order the re-
moval of the fence because it was not "definitely offensive."'
The first court to enjoin a landowner's unaesthetic activity solely due
to its unsightliness was the Virginia Supreme Court in its 1982 decision
of Foley v. Harris." In that case, the court enjoined keeping wrecked
automobiles on a lot 2 in a residential area because the "junk" automobiles
were extremely ugly. " The court based its actions on a restrictive covenant
25. 141 W.Va. 595, 93 S.E.2d 835 (1956).
26. Id., 93 S.E.2d, at 844.
27. See. e.g., Mahoney v. Walter, 157 W.Va. 822, 205 S.E.2d 692, 699-700 (1974) "[tlhe
unsightliness of the [salvage] yard itself, the noise necessitated by the preparing of the junked
automobiles for removal, the possible danger of flammable materials, the possible danger to children
from the unprotected nature of the area, and the prevalence of rodents and insects justified the trial
court in finding that a nuisance existed regardless of whether the area was exclusively or primarily
residential." Id., 205 S.E.2d, at 699-700.
28. 271 Or. 16, 530 P.2d 37 (1975).
29. Id., 530 P.2d, at 39.
30. Id. Note that the plaintiffs also claimed that the unsightly fence would cause a loss in rental
income from its motel because potential customers did not want to view the fence out of their
windows. The court, however, treated this claim of damage as incidental to the aesthetic nuisance
claim since the harm to the view is the alleged source of all damage. This approach seems proper
and has been used in explaining zoning decisions. See, Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the
Police Power: The New General Welfare and the Presumption of Constitutionality. 34 VAND. L.
REV. 603, 614 (1981).
31. 223 Va. 20, 286 S.E.2d 186 (1982).
32. The lot contained: "'old abandoned cars' and an 'old van that is used as a tool shed....
[Slome cars were moved off and others moved onto the lot, that the number on the property at any
one time varied from 6 to 16, and that at the time of the hearing there were 6, 4 of which could
not be moved under their own power." Id., 286 S.E.2d, at 187.
33. The plaintiffs also complained about a drop in property values, but the court properly treated
it as part of the aesthetic question. See supra note 30.
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in the deed to the defendant's lot which contained the clause that "[njo
nuisance shall be maintained."'" The court then applied the common law
of nuisance to determine whether keeping the "junked, abandoned, or
disabled vehicles" 35 on the lot was disallowed by the covenant. The court
found that aesthetic considerations were relevant to ascertaining whether
a particular activity was a nuisance. This interpretation of such a restrictive
covenant is highly significant because subdivision and condominium own-
ers are increasingly using restrictive covenants that prohibit lot purchasers
from maintaining nuisances on their land.36
Although the Foley case was the first case to expressly hold that an
unaesthetic activity, without more, may warrant injunctive relief under a
nuisance theory, there may have been many cases involving funeral homes
in which courts have covertly taken into account important aesthetic
considerations. In these cases, funeral homes proposed for construction
in residential areas were enjoined, not because they were noisy or pre-
sented a health hazard, but because of the reaction they elicit upon view."
As the Arkansas Supreme Court noted, a funeral home's "continuous
suggestion of death and dead bodies tends to destroy the comfort and
34. The complete text of the restrictive covenant is: "No nuisance shall be maintained upon the
lot hereby conveyed nor upon any lot on Forest Road .... Foley v. Harris, 223 Va. 20, 286 S.E.2d
186, 187 (1982).
35. id., 286 S.E.2d, at 190.
36. The restrictive covenants for Rio Rancho Estates, Inc. in Sandoval County, N.M., e.g.,
include the following provisions:
10. No billboard, unsightly objects, or nuisance shall be erected, placed or permitted
to remain on any lot, nor shall any lot be used in any way or for any purpose
which may endanger the health or unreasonably disturb other lot owners.
12. Nor shall any lot be used in whole or in part for the storage of any property or
object that will cause such lot to appear on an unclean or untidy condition or that
will be obnoxiouis to the eye.
37. See, e.g., Travis v. Moore, 377 So.2d 609 (Miss. 1979). "The chancellor found that the
proposed construction would not create noises, unusual odors, slamming of doors, the ringing of
telephones, unusual and unnecessary automobile noises, the display of caskets and other burial
paraphernalia and would not be conducted in an unsanitary area.... The chancellor found that the
only injury complained of by the appellants was that the conduct of the funeral home business at
the proposed site would have a depressing effect upon them and their families by reason of its
frequent reminder of death and that such was not sufficient to deny construction of a lawful and
necessary business, since he interpreted the law to require that the injury complained of be physical,
as distinguished from purely imaginative. The learned chancellor misinterpreted the Mississippi rule
. . . [which] relates to mental depression and anxiety rather than physical injury. We hold that
appellants reside in an essentially residential neighborhood and that they are entitled to be protected
in the enjoyment of their property rights without the intrusion of the funeral home business in their
midst." Id. at 612. See also Rockenbach v. Apostle, 330 Mich. 338, 47 N.W.2d 636 (1951).
"Funerals, hearses, coffins ... are conducive to depression, and sorrow, and deprive a home of
the comfort and repose to which its owners are entitled. It is not necessary to show damage from
disease or unpleasantness of odors arising from maintenance of such a business in order to enjoin
it. Emotions, caused by the constant contemplation of death... are more acute in their painfulness,
in many cases, than suffering perceived through the senses." Id., 47 N.w.2d at 642. See also Jack
v. Torrant, 136 Conn. 414, 71 A.2d 705 (1950). "As a result of the operation of this funeral business
. I [it] had an immediate and continuing depressing effect upon them [plaintiffs] which substantially
decreased their quiet and peaceful enjoyment of their home." ld., 71 A.2d at 711.
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repose sought in home ownership."" Thus, what has really happened is
that courts have probably always considered the aesthetic quality of the
activity but are only now expressly deciding nuisance cases on aesthetic
grounds.
In conclusion, the cases reviewed in this section, in addition to the
Colorado decision of Allison v. Smith noted in the introduction, have
evidenced a trend toward expressly recognizing aesthetic concerns as the
basis for a nuisance suit. The next section explores the rationale behind
this trend.
THE RATIONALE FOR TAKING AESTHETIC CONSIDERATIONS INTO
ACCOUNT IN NUISANCE SUITS
Courts have traditionally avoided recognizing aesthetics as the basis
for a nuisance action because courts have tended to belittle aesthetic
concerns. What the courts have said is that judges should not venture
into such an area which is fraught with subjectivity and could interfere
with valuable property rights.39 In the recent decision of Ness v. Albert,'
for example, the defendant had accumulated various items of "junk" on
his property including old sinks and stoves and a partially burned house
trailer. The plaintiff neighbor sued solely on aesthetic grounds and got a
damages award from a jury.4' The Missouri appellate court reversed this
decision saying unsightliness alone cannot create a cause of action. The
court explained:
Aesthetic considerations are fraught with subjectivity. One man's
pleasure may be another man's perturbation.. . .Judicial forage into
such a nebulous area would be chaotic. Any imaginary good from
doing so is far outweighed by the lurking danger of unduly circum-
scribing inherent rights of ownership of property and grossly intim-
idating their lawful exercise.4
38. Powell v. Taylor, 222 Ark. 896, 263 S.W.2d 906, 907 (1954).
39. See, e.g., Mathewson v. Primeau, 64 Wash.2d 929, 395 P.2d 183 (1964); Mahlstadt v. City
of Indianola, 251 Iowa 222, 100 N.W.2d 189 (1959).
40. 665 S.W.2d I (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
41. The jury awarded $4,000 in compensatory damages and $8,500 in punitive damages. Id. at
I.
42. Id. at 2.
43. See, e.g., National Used Cars, Inc. v. City of Kalamazoo, 61 Mich. App. 520, 233 N.W.2d
64 (1975) (junkyard zoning ordinance decision). "We are advised by the plaintiff that an aesthetic
standard . . . involves subjective evaluation. Modem thinking seems to refute this notion however
and 'recent studies have demonstrated that there is consensus in matters of aesthetics and that aesthetic
judgments can be supported by appeal to publicly ascertainable facts.'" Id., 233 N.W.2d at 67
(quoting Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectivity, 71 MICH . L. REv. 1438,
1442 (1973)).
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Underlying this reasoning is a disrespect by these courts for aesthetic
concerns. This rationale assumes that aesthetically displeasing activity
cannot possibly create a substantial interference with a landowner's prop-
erty interest. Yet the response of those courts recognizing aesthetic con-
siderations would be that ugliness can destroy the very purpose of owning
property and this can be objectively determined.43 In Allison v. Smith,"
for example, the plaintiffs stopped using their mountain cabin because
the psychological benefit they got from the scenery had been ruined.
Similarly, the dock in Heston v. Ousler4" ruined the plaintiff's view of
the lake, a primary reason for owning their home. In short, "offensive
and unsightly conditions do have adverse effect on people."" These cases
do not involve any subjectivity, but involve objectively determined un-
reasonable conduct. These cases lead to the conclusion that judges can
effectively use an objective standard of whether an activity is "unneigh-
borly according to contemporary community standards."'47
The likelihood that more courts will now recognize the importance of
aesthetic considerations in nuisance cases is evidenced by the recent
judicial recognition of aesthetic concerns as a proper purpose for zoning-
the state's method for regulating land use. By the early 1980s a majority
of states changed their position and held that aesthetics alone can justify
44. See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
46. Diemeke v. State Highway Comm'n, 444 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Mo. 1969). See also Temple
Baptist Church, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 98 N.M. 138, 144, 646 P.2d 565 (1982). "Aesthetics
... provides for comfort, happiness, and enhancement of the citizens' cultural life and sustains the
value of property." Id., 646 P.2d at 571. See also City of Independence v. Richards, 666 S. W.2d
I (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). There is "an emergent public awareness that an unsightly environment
impinges adversely on human sensibility." Id. at 5. See also Sun Oil Co. v. City of Madison Heights,
41 Mich. App. 47, 199 N.W.2d 525 (1972). "The modem trend is to recognize that a community's
aesthetic well-being can contribute to urban man's psychological and emotional stability." Id., 199
N.W.2d at 529. See generally Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of the
Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REv. 355 (1982). "IThe environment is a visual commons impregnated
with meanings and associations that fulfill individual and group needs for identity confirmation....
The cultural stability hypothesis views controversies about 'beauty' as surrogates for disagreements
about environmental change itself. Aesthetic policy, therefore, serves a role in the social system
similar to that which homeostatic mechanisms serve in the human body.. . . [lindividuals and groups
must cope with threats to their personal and social identity and, hence, to cultural stability when
new entrants imperil existing resources. What they seek when they press aesthetic demands upon
governmental policymakers are measures that will function, in essence, as socially homeostatic
devices. From their perspective, the goal of these measures is to regulate the pace and character of
environmental change in a manner that precludes or mitigates damage to their identity." d. at 419-
20.
47. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Controls,
40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 732 (1973).
48. See State v. Jones, 305 N.C. 520, 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982) (describing the shift among
jurisdictions). See generally Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: A New Majority of Jurisdictions
Authorize Aesthetic Regulation, 48 U.M.C. L. REv. 125 (1980).
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zoning regulation of junkyards,49 billboards,5" and trash." This trend is
likely to spill over into future nuisance decisions because now courts are
more confident that land use issues affecting aesthetic values can be
objectively determined.
In conclusion, visually offensive conditions on a neighbor's property
can substantially interfere with the use of one's own property. Therefore,
aesthetic considerations should be taken into account in nuisance actions.
Nevertheless, some limitations are needed.
THE LIMITS OF AN AESTHETIC NUISANCE CAUSE OF ACTION
As a practical matter, most nuisance cases having an aesthetic com-
ponent will also involve more traditional types of harm like noise, odor,
or safety hazards which may warrant. injunctive relief. This would be
true, for example, in many junkyard cases.52 Therefore, the question of
whether an activity can be enjoined solely on aesthetic grounds will not
often arise. When the question is raised, however, the two elements a
plaintiff must prove in a nuisance case is that the nuisance is substantial
and that it is unreasonable.
The Colorado court in Allison v. Smith warned of the substantiality
requirement when it stated "it is not enough that a thing such as accu-
mulated debris and rubbish be unsightly or that it offends one's aesthetic
senses."53 Rather, it must be "unduly offensive" to its neighbors.' In
addition, it must be offensive to a "normal person in the community," 5
not to one of peculiar sensibilities. Perhaps a more practical test is whether
the alleged unaesthetic activity defeats the primary psychological benefit
the normal property owner derives from his property. Under this reason-
ing, a funeral parlor is always enjoinable when proposed for construction
in a residential area, but a junkyard might not be depending on the quality
of the area and extent of junk.
An interesting borderline case highlighting the substantiality require-
49. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 305 N.C. 520, 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982); State v. Smith, 618 S.W.2d
474 (Tenn. 1981); State v. Bernhard, 173 Mont. 464, 568 P.2d 136 (1977); Buhler v. Stone, 533
P.2d 292 (Utah 1975); Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964); Deimeke v. State
Highway Comm'n, 444 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. 1969); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35, 400 P.2d 255
(1965); National Used Cars, Inc. v. City of Kalamazoo, 61 Mich. App. 520, 233 N.W.2d 64 (1975).
50. See, e.g., Temple Baptist Church, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 98 N.M. 138, 646 P.2d 565
(1982); City of Wales v. Lamar Adv. Ass'n, 414 So.2d 1030 (Fla. 1982); Goodman Toyota, Inc. v.
City of Raleigh, 63 N.C.App. 660, 306 S.E.2d 192 (1983), cert. denied, 310 N.C. 477, 312 S.E.2d
884 (1984); Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 528, 324 A.2d 113
(1974).
51. See, e.g., City of Independence v. Richards, 666 S.W.2d I (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
52. See Mahoney v. Walter, 157 W.Va. 822, 205 S.E.2d 692 (1979).
53. Allison v. Smith, 695 P.2d 791, 794 (Coto. Ct. App. 1984).
54. Id.
55. Foley v. Harris, 233 Va. 20, 286 S.E.2d 186, 191 (1982).
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ment is Acadian Heritage Realty v. City of Lafayette,' a Louisiana ap-
pellate court decision. In that case, a solid waste disposal mound placed
by the city in a residential subdivision reached thirty feet in height. The
mound, termed "Mount Everest," was ordered by the trial court to be
lowered to five feet solely because of its unaesthetic nature.5 7 The appeals
court reversed, stating that the "unsightliness" was only an "inconven-
ience, "s' and cited a statute which states that each landowner must endure
"4some inconvenience to his neighbor."'59 The court simply felt that the
substantiality factor was not met. Implicit in this decision, however, may
be a recognition that a city needs to have an efficient landfill operation.
This suggests the second limiting factor in aesthetic nuisance cases: that
the nuisance be unreasonable.
A nuisance is unreasonable when the harm to the plaintiff exceeds the
value to the defendant and the community of the offensive activity.'
Notably, in those cases where an activity has been enjoined on aesthetic
grounds the cost to the defendant has been minimal. In Foley v. Harris,
the Virginia junkyard case, the court found that it "would be 'very simple
and inexpensive' for the Foleys to remove the cars. "6' In Allison v. Smith,
removing the stockpiled items would not interfere with the business ac-
tivities of the defendants. Therefore, a court is more likely to find an
actionable aesthetic nuisance when the cost to the defendant is minimal.
CONCLUSION
The judicial movement toward recognizing aesthetic considerations as
a factor in nuisance actions, and even as a sole basis for a nuisance action,
has emerged. Some courts, however, still balk at taking aesthetic concerns
into account on the ground that it is too subjective an area for judicial
tampering with property rights.62 Such cases will increasingly become
the minority view because courts increasingly believe that aesthetic con-
56. 451 So.2d 17 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
57. The trial court found "that a thirty foot hill of garbage rising from the flat countryside sticks
out like a 'sore thumb,' and a lowering to a height of five feet above the ground would lessen the
blight on the countryside." Id. at 23.
58. Id. at 24.
59. Id. The complete statute reads as follows: "Although one be not at liberty to make any work
by which his neighbor's buildings may be damaged, yet every one [sic] has the liberty of doing on
his own ground whatsoever he pleases, although it should occasion some inconvenience to his
neighbor. Thus he who is not subject to any servitude originating from a particular agreement in
that respect, may raise his house as high as he pleases, although by such elevation he should darken
the lights of [neighbor's] house, because this act occasions only an inconvenience, but not real
damage." The statute is LSA-CC art. 668.
60. See supra note 9.
61. Foley v. Harris, 223 Va. 20, 286 S.E.2d 186, 191 (1982) (quoting the lower court).
62. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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cerns are legitimate and can be objectively defined using a community
neighborliness standard.
The words of West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Maxwell, spoken
in 1937, are finally ringing true:
Happily, the day has arrived when persons may entertain appre-
ciation of the aesthetic and be heard in equity in vindication of their
love of the beautiful, without becoming objects of opprobrium.
Basically, this is because a thing visually offensive may seriously
affect the residents of a community in the reasonable enjoyment of
their homes, and may produce a decided reduction in property values.
Courts must not be indifferent to the truth that within essential lim-
itations aesthetics has a proper place in the community affairs of
modem society."
63. Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W.Va. 608, 191 S.E. 368, 371 (1937).
[Vol. 27
